2 edition of Counterforce targeting capabilities and challenges found in the catalog.
Counterforce targeting capabilities and challenges
Barry R Schneider
|Statement||by Barry R. Schneider|
|Series||Counterproliferation papers -- no. 22|
|Contributions||USAF Counterproliferation Center|
|LC Classifications||UG743 .S32 2004|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||iii, 42 p. :|
|Number of Pages||42|
|LC Control Number||2005364707|
In Krepon’s volume, I have co-authored a chapter titled Pakistan, MIRVs, and Counterforce Targeting with Mansoor Ahmed, Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow () at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. In the chapter, we analyse Pakistan's options should India decide to develop and deploy multiple warhead missiles. Second, the precept specifies that this strike by India would be ‘counterforce’ that refers to target enemy’s nuclear weapons and military infrastructure rather than existing counter-value.
Still, India’s hypersonic capabilities would likely bring new challenges to regional security. They will further embolden India resort to a counterforce first strike against Pakistan. Experts from Pakistan, nonetheless, caution that expanding Indian capabilities could be moving towards a possible change in its nuclear posture from counter-value to counterforce targeting. Such possible intentions and doctrine suggest a possible shift away from Delhi’s heretofore NFU pledge.
National Security Acquisition Challenges Jacques S. Gansler William Lucyshyn. Chief of Staff, US Air Force. Each is conditioned by the capabilities of the other, and duced by nuclear weapons do not stem from countervalue or counterforce targeting but . For counterforce targets, one needs weapons with precise accuracy, required range, and sufficient speed. It is also necessary to possess modern Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities for target assessment and acquisition. The destruction of targets can only be assured through the availability of these capabilities.
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OCLC Number: Notes: "August "--Added title page. Description: iii, 42 pages: illustrations ; 26 cm. Contents: I. Introduction ideal counterforce capability revolution in accuracy ations of stealth for counterforce targeting --V. Solving the challenge of hardened deeply buried targets g the challenge of targeting mobile missile launchers.
COUNTERFORCE TARGETING CAPABILITIES AND CHALLENGES. by Barry R. Schneider The Counterproliferation Papers Future Warfare Series No. 22 USAF Counterproliferation Center Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Report Documentation PageForm Approved OMB No. Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per Cited by: 1.
Get this from a library. Counterforce targeting capabilities and challenges. [Barry R Schneider; USAF Counterproliferation Center.]. The item Counterforce targeting capabilities and challenges, by Barry R.
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This item is available to borrow from 1library branch. Counterforce Targeting Capabilities and Challenges. Counterforce targeting is one of the important means of removing potential weapons of mass destruction WMD threats to the United States and its allies and is one of the multiple means available to thin out the weapons of mass destruction threat.
To fully understand what progress the United States has made in counterforce capability, as Cited by: 1. Author: Barry R. Schneider Publisher: Greenwood Publishing Group ISBN: Size: MB Format: PDF, Mobi View: Get Books Presents a balanced account of the current biological menaces and discusses the defensive countermeasures underway to.
Although the article was written in the context of U.S. counterforce capabilities, this review can be applied to how growing counterforce weapons in South Asia affect deterrence stability between Pakistan and India.
Changing capabilities for counterforce first-strike The second set of evidence that Clary and Narang present concerns India’s new capabilities, especially those that allow the country’s leaders “to start thinking about first-strike strategies – or damage-limiting, launch-on-warning strategies” (p.
25). The Strategic Plans Division is already ramping up Pakistan’s counterforce capabilities, presuming the need to compete in this sphere with India.
Vipin’s take on Menon’s book will no doubt add impetus to this compulsion. But it’s not too late to avoid reprising the U.S.-Soviet counterforce competition on a regional scale.
Increasingly, Indian officials are advancing the logic of counterforce targeting, and they have begun to lay out exceptions to India's long-standing no-first-use policy to potentially allow for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons.
Simultaneously, India has been acquiring the components that its military would need to launch counterforce strikes. On the other hand, the enhancing of counterforce capabilities indicates a shift in a state’s targeting strategy and may undermine the credibility of its commitment to uphold the NFU pledge: the fact remains, as pointed out by Leiber and Press, that counterforce capabilities amplify the temptation as well as ability to launch a preemptive.
In nuclear strategy, a counterforce target is one that has a military value, such as a launch silo for intercontinental ballistic missiles, an airbase at which nuclear-armed bombers are stationed, a homeport for ballistic missile submarines, or a command and control installation.
The intent of a counterforce strategy (attacking counterforce targets with nuclear weapons) is to do a pre-emptive. In particular, some claim that new capabilities are necessary for penetrating the future ballistic missile defenses of U.S.
adversaries and improving counterforce capabilities. When asked at a congressional hearing why the new ICBM needed more capability and accuracy, General Robin Rand, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, replied: The move from counter-value targeting to counter-force targeting would call for the revamping of Indian nuclear stockpile and nuclear technology.
Ensuring the complete detection and elimination of Pakistan’s nuclear capacity would need impressive precision and vast improvements in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
Second, the precept specifies that this strike by India would be ‘counterforce’ that refers to target enemy’s nuclear weapons and military infrastructure rather than existing counter-value strategy, which aims at targeting adversary’s civilians and cities. There were two basic targeting concepts: counterforce and countervalue.
Counterforce emphasized strikes on the enemy’s military forces, installations, and assets. Countervalue, also called countercity early on, centered on the enemy’s economy and population. Countervalue was easier, cheaper, and could be done with simpler capabilities.
The article concludes that future iterations of AI-enhanced cyber counterforce capabilities will complicate the existing challenges of cyber defence, and in turn, compromise nuclear assets and. Perception of strong counterforce capability increases the temptation to attack, without having the assurance of perfect success, setting in motion a catastrophic chain of events.
A counterforce strike will cause enormous civilian casualties in the target country, but also possibly in neighboring countries. Table 1 illustrates the consequences of these improvements against two hypothetical target sets: moderately hard mobile missile shelters and hardened missile silos.
49 Row 1 shows the approximate counterforce capabilities of a era U.S. Minuteman III ICBM strike; a 2-on-1 attack would have been expected to leave 8 mobile missile. Initiatives and Challenges in Consequence Management After a WMD Attack Counterforce Targeting Capabilities and Challenges Barry R.
Schneider. Ayman Al-Zawahiri: The Ideologue of Modern Islamic Militancy Books. Writing for CSDS. Writing Awards. Knowledge Center. Resources. Increasingly, Indian officials are advancing the logic of counterforce targeting, and they have begun to lay out exceptions to India's long-standing no-first-use policy to potentially allow for.
The information coming to the West from various sources, either open or closed, regarding the Chinese Navy, concludes on the finding that in the last couple of decades an extensive program of modernization and numerical expansion of the Navy, by the Chinese authorities, is underway.
The fundamental pillar of China’s (not-so-future) Navy, known as the [ ].In military doctrine, countervalue is the targeting of an opponent's assets which are of value but not actually a military threat, such as cities and civilian populations.
Counterforce is the targeting of an opponent's military forces and facilities. The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., records the first use of the word in and the first use in the modern sense inwhere it is.